Thursday, August 21, 2025

Purpose of the Right to Vote Not Protected Says Court Ruling

Preface:

If the purpose of the right to vote in Canada is not protected by our constitution then how close are we to sham elections in our future?

On Aug 11 2025 a court ruling stated (par 29, 30): “Justice McLachlin described effective representation as a freestanding right, rather than simply the purpose of the right to vote…In doing so she merged conceptually distinct concepts: rights, which are constitutionally protected, and the purpose of particular constitutionally protected rights, which is not.”

I had to blink and read that again when I first saw it:

In a discussion of the Canadian Charter right to vote (Section 3), that ruling stated that the purpose of the right to vote is not constitutionally protected.

If the purpose of the right to vote in Canada is not protected by our constitution then how serious are the implications?

Let us remind ourselves that some countries do have sham elections, where people go through the motions of voting but their vote doesn’t mean anything.

So how much does our vote mean in Canada?

Some people would say that in Canada we have always had something that is too close to being like sham elections. These people point to what they call “Canada’s false majorities,” when a party can get a majority of seats with only a minority of the popular vote.

So, what exactly is a sham election?

Did this latest court ruling put us closer to it or farther from it in Canada?

Is the purpose of the right to vote related to having a fair vote?

If not, then what is the purpose of the right to vote?

For all of us who care about democracy we should all be paying attention because right now there is a case going through our courts that appears to be a struggle to define the purpose of the right to vote in Canada.

Synopsis:

On Aug 11 2025 the Ontario Court of Appeal's decision dismissed the appeal of Fair Voting BC v Canada (commonly known as the Charter Challenge for Fair Voting). Two judges (Huscroft J.A. and Trotter J.A.) wrote a majority opinion, and the third (Dawe J.A.) concurred in the decision to dismiss the appeal, but disagreed about some of the reasoning.

Because of this, the appellant, Fair Voting BC, needs to seek leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada.

Nevertheless, here’s why I believe that this case stands a good chance of eventually being successful in important ways.

Justice Dawe’s critique of the majority interpretation of section 3 of the Charter (the right to vote) calls into question the rationale they use to dismiss the appeal. But there is evidence (below) that Justice Dawe does not replace that rationale with a sufficiently ironclad alternative rationale of his own. His rationale, too, is also subject to significant critique as you’ll see in the evidence below.

Therefore, in my view, the weakness of all three of the judges’ arguments shows that there are ample grounds for appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada.

First, by way of clarification:

This blog post mainly deals with, Section 3 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. It reads: “Every citizen of Canada has the right to vote in an election of members of the House of Commons or of a legislative assembly and to be qualified for membership therein.”
 
Second, let’s look at Justice Dawe’s ruling:

On the one hand, Justice Dawe emphasizes the below quote from McLachlin in the Saskatchewan Boundaries Reference.

Quote:
p. 185, that:
"[D]eviations from absolute voter parity may be justified on the grounds of practical impossibility or the provision of more effective representation. Beyond this, dilution of one citizen’s vote as compared with another’s should not be countenanced. [Emphasis added [by Justice Dawe].]"
End quote

On the other hand, Justice Dawe’s next paragraph (103) implies that those “practical impossibilities” extend to all electoral systems to the same degree. With the below quote he appears to erroneously lump together all electoral systems by using the word “all.”

“To the contrary, I am satisfied that legislatures have considerable leeway to choose between a wide range of different electoral models that all provide effective representation and “meaningful participation” in the electoral process to a sufficient extent to meet the demands of s. 3.”

The word “all” is categorical.

On the other hand, the McLachlin phrase, “more effective representation” implies that “effective representation” is relative; not categorical nor absolute.

The word, “more” implies that in the phrase “effective representation,” the adjective “effective” is relative. That is to say the representation in question can be “more” effective, or less effective. It’s a matter of degree. It is not a categorical absolute matter of an electoral system being demarcated as either “effective” or “not effective.”

Here is only some of the evidence that some electoral systems consistently provide representation that is “more” effective than other electoral systems:

The appellant, Fair Voting BC, previously presented the 2004 Law Commission as evidence. That Commission was referred to by Prof. Larry LeDuc (an expert for the Applicants on “Electoral Systems” and “Political Behaviour”) in the first Factum of the Applicants: Par 11 mentions the Commission’s report, “Voting Counts: Electoral Reform for Canada.”

The Commission states on pg 155: “…The new system would be fairer; it would be more representative of our society; it would be more inclusive (in terms of smaller parties); it would reduce the number of disregarded votes; and it would make party caucuses in the House of Commons more representative of the various regions in the country. It could also help to increase voter turnout. For these reasons, a mixed member proportional electoral system meets, and indeed surpasses, any realistic test for proving the desirability of reform.” 

(Note: the mixed member proportional system is only one of several proportional systems. I give this particular example simply to show that proportional systems in general achieve more effective representation for voters.)

In terms of “reducing the number of disregarded votes,” Fair Voting BC also provided to the courts a method to quantify the “relative parity of voting power” that is discussed in the [1991] Saskatchewan Electoral Boundaries Reference. In that case the Supreme Court of Canada concluded (at p 183) that the first condition of effective representation is “relative parity of voting power.” (See Footnote 1)

That Law Commission quote above aligns with a “purposive” interpretation of section 3 of the Charter that is referred to in these quotes from Jim Young of the Centre for Constitutional Studies, below:

Quote One:
“A Literal Reading or Broad Reading
…In interpreting the content of section 3, courts have had to determine whether it should be read literally or purposively. That is, should the court adhere to a plain reading of section 3 or should it read in implicit restrictions and democratic ideals?”

Quote Two:
“Justice Cory…said, “[In] the interpretation of all enfranchising statutes the provisions granting the right to vote should be given a broad and liberal interpretation. Every effort should be made to interpret the statute to enfranchise the voter.””

The “new system” recommended by the 2004 Law Commission is one of several proportional electoral systems that does exactly that: It “enfranchises” “more” voters by “reducing the number of disregarded votes.”

Question: In the Aug 11 2025 ruling does Justice Dawe read section 3 literally or purposively?

Answer: Actually he appears to be doing both --in what appears to be an incongruent fashion: In his criticism of the majority opinion (par 101, 102) he appears to be reading the content of sec. 3 purposively, but in par 103, when he provides his own rationale for dismissing the appeal, he appears to be reading it literally.

In light of all of the above, in my view, Justice Dawe’s literal reading of sec. 3 may have, whether intentionally or not, caused him to appear to be misinterpreting Fair Voting BC’s argument:

As I understand it, Fair Voting BC’s argument was not that all voters categorically need to elect a representative to meet the requirement of sec 3. Instead that argument was that we need to make every effort to “enfranchise” “more” voters by “reducing the number of disregarded votes.” This means maximizing the number of voters who elect an MP. This would be an effort towards "the democratic ideal" of "more" “relative parity of voting power.” (See link) This effort is made when reading the content of sec. 3 purposively as opposed to literally.

In conclusion:

How important is this case?

I see it as an integral part of the struggle to define the purpose of the right to vote in Canada.

I believe this has huge implications as to whether we get closer to, or farther from sham elections in our future.

Is that important enough for you to support?

If so, I recommend supporting the grassroots supported Charter Challenge for Fair Voting. This effort would not be possible without your support --either financially, or simply by telling your friends about it.

Footnotes:

Footnote 1:

That 2004 Law Commission report did meet the legal requirements of being an “Expert Opinion” because it was written by a panel of experts lead by Nathalie Des Rosiers. Also see this link.  

The fact that the 2004 Law Commission report did meet that legal requirement perhaps makes it more admissible as evidence than Antony Hodgson’s affidavit. The status of Hodgson’s affidavit was questioned in the first hearing. There was debate about whether Hodgson was either an expert witness, or a fact witness, or neither.

Nevertheless his affidavit has never been struck down as inadmissible. If his affidavit is written about by an expert then the status of that affidavit could, in the future, still be elevated to be considered as coming from an expert witness.

The Hodgson affidavit quantifies the degree of the effectiveness of representation on the basis of “relative parity of voting power” See link.



Tuesday, January 28, 2025

Israel and proportional representation:

Some people say that they don’t want proportional representation because of the example of Israel:

We need to ask each of these individual people two questions:
1. What particular aspect of Israel’s situation is undesirable to you in particular?
2. Is that particular aspect caused by the electoral system? -- Or by something else?


For example, here are two aspects that likely have a more distant cause-and-effect relationship with the electoral system within Israel:
1. The history and premises of the formation of the state of Israel and the volatility that can create
2. Israel’s Occupation of Palestinian territories and the volatility that can create

Here are two other examples of aspects that should be examined as to whether or not they have a closer cause-and-effect relationship with the electoral system: 

1. The perceived instability of politics within Israel
2. The perceived control by small parties within Israel

Only after a discussion isolates the particular aspect of Israel’s situation that is undesirable to certain individual people, only then we can begin to examine whether or not that particular aspect has a cause-and-effect relationship with the electoral system and/or with any one of the particular features of Israel’s particular electoral system. 


Voter Equality (Relative Voter Parity) as a Fundamental Mathematical Principle of Equality and Fairness in a Democracy:


Proportional representation is a principle; it is not an electoral system itself.

It is the principle of a government representing voters in proportion to their vote.

In that respect, proportional representation is more fair than disproportional representation. That’s a mathematics-centered assessment of whether or not voters get represented equally and fairly.

This means that if there is any unfairness in Israel’s particular situation that is not caused by, or partially caused by, its electoral system, then that unfairness would be added to, compounded, and made worse if the electoral system were based on disproportional representation instead of proportional representation. If proportional representation was removed from Israel’s situation then there is a high probability that many of its particular problems would be worsened, not improved.

Obviously proportional representation is not the only ingredient needed to make things more fair. But it is definitely one of the necessary ingredients.

When an electoral system is designed using the principle of proportional representation that is one of the necessary ingredients of a truly representative democracy -- that is truly representative of it voters.

It’s like the ingredient of water in soup: You can’t have soup without it.

But if there are rocks in the soup you’ll still crack your teeth even if it has water.


There are several challenges facing Israel. With each one of these individual challenges, we have to ask ourselves, “Does that particular challenge have any relation to the electoral system?” “Is this particular challenge a function of the electoral system, or is it not a function of the electoral system?” To describe what it means for one thing to “be a function of” another thing, consider this analogy: Ringing a bicycle bell will not make the bicycle move forward. Therefore a bicycle’s movement is not a function of ringing the bell. In other words, a bicycle’s movement is has “no relation to” ringing the bell.

Other examples of improving election fairness that are not related to the electoral system would include:
1. enacting better rules on election spending,
2. political donations,
3. Media that is not dominated by too few voices: This facilitates informed voting.

Also there are other things apart from elections to foster fairness in between elections: For example: Improve rules on lobbying, transparency, diversity in media, media that is not beholden to their wealthy advertisers, etc.

 
Evidence, probabilities and correlations to Proportional Representation:


Internationally, there is much more evidence to support proportional representation (PR) than not.

Most nations with PR do better than Canada in several areas: environment, income inequality, etc. See link 

The evidence may not show that every single nation does better in these areas.

But in terms of overall, collective evidence and probability mathematics, the exceptions are less likely to occur. Unfortunately, cherry picking Israel focuses on one of those exceptions.

It’s counter to the logic of probability mathematics to cherry pick and selectively single out Israel as an example of what can go wrong with a country that chooses PR.

Again, we ask, “Are Israel’s problems caused by its electoral system or by something else?”

Once that is determined then we can begin to examine each particular design feature of Israel’s electoral system to see if it could be re-engineered and tweaked to reduce a particular ongoing problem.

For example, it could be the fact that their electoral party threshold has been relatively low for many years, or it could be that its closed list feature does not allow the voter to have enough power; or it could be a combination of those two and/or other features.

 
Israel’s Electoral Party Threshold is below average


From the perspective of global averages, Israel’s electoral party threshold has been relatively low for too many years, and is still below average even after they raised it several times.

The electoral threshold for a party to be allocated a Knesset seat was only 1% until 1988 (40 yrs); it was then raised to 1.5% and remained at that level until 2003 (15 yrs), when it was again raised to 2% (11 yrs). On 11 March 2014, the Knesset approved a new law to raise the threshold to 3.25% (approximately 4 seats).

Date

Time period

Israel’s Electoral Threshold (Most PR countries use 5%)

1948 – 1988

40 yrs

1%

1988 – 2003

15 yrs

1.5%

2003 – 2014

11 yrs

2%

2014 to present

 

3.25%

Source https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elections_in_Israel#History

Here are some of the thresholds used by other countries as of June 2024 (incomplete list of countries which use proportional representation). Notice that 19 countries have threshold at or below Israel’s; whereas 24 countries have a threshold above Israel’s.

Threshold (%)

0+

1+

2+

3+ Israel

4+

5+

6+

7+

8

Number of countries

8

-

3

8

7

14

1

1

1

Source https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Proportional_representation#List_of_countries_using_proportional_representation  

Israel has a closed list electoral system:

This puts the power of choosing candidates more into the hands of the party than of the voter.

Israel has a party-list electoral system:


Multiple candidates are elected through their position on an electoral list. Geographically and electorally speaking, Israel is organized as all one electoral district. That is unconstitutional in Canada which has provinces and local ridings.

See sources:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Party-list_proportional_representation

https://www.fairvote.ca/22/01/2020/what-about-israel/

  
Conclusion: 


When we separate, distinguish, and differentiate, the different cause-and-effect relationships, we can recognize which cause is related to which effect in Israel’s unique situation. 


Footnote:


Dennis Pilon has looked at two particular aspects of Israel’s electoral system. See link 

In terms of the perceived instability, he found that Israel is just as stable as Canada.

In terms of the perceived influence of small parties, he found that “dominant parties supplied the Prime Minister and all senior ministers while small parties were not able to exact much by way of concessions or cabinet posts.”