Sunday, August 27, 2023

Canada’s election laws have silenced Green [and "labour"] voters for far too long – says constitutional expert in Op Ed supportive of the Charter Challenge for Fair Voting


David Beatty, a noted constitutional expert, recently wrote an Op Ed in the Globe and Mail entitled "Canada's election laws have silenced Green voters for far too long," which is supportive of the Charter Challenge for Fair Voting. 

But it's not only Green voters who should take note of this challenge: Beatty has demonstrated his constitutional expertise with publications such as Putting the Charter to Work: Designing a Constitutional Labour Code which may be of interest not only to Green Voters interested in labour rights but also to NDP voters interested in labour rights: 

Both these voter groups should take an interest in how the Charter Challenge for Fair Voting can help in their particular struggles for their basic civil rights -- rights that have been denied to them by the unfair electoral systems in Canada and its provinces which, on average, tend to favour the top two dominant parties. See evidence in Footnote below.

Question: Would a court decision in the Charter Challenge for Fair Voting apply to provincial electoral systems as well, or just the federal system?

Answer (from this link on the Charter Challenge website): "Our case asks the court to rule specifically on the federal voting system. A decision in our favour would only have immediate implications and effects on the federal government.

However, a Supreme Court decision in favour of our case would set a strong precedent for all future cases of it’s kind. In many cases involving charter law where a strong precedent has been set by the Surpeme Court, it increases the chances that a case will be resolved at a lower court, and governments often take proactive steps to avoid legal battles they cannot win."

Footnote:


Above graph sourced from "Is Canada Fair?" at this link. (Orange is NDP; green is Greens; red is Liberal; blue is Conservative.)

Also, it should be noted that the above graph shows national results only. But when you look at regions, election results from all parties are distorted with First Past the Post, as we see in Wilf Day's quote below (See his great blog at this link):

Quote:

"Myth: PR helps only the NDP and Greens.
Fact: In the 2015 election, in the GTA 396,000 NDP votes were ineffective, disregarded, wasted, and thrown in the garbage can by our skewed winner-take-all system.
But 944,000 Conservative votes in the GTA were ineffective.
And so were 993,000 Liberal votes in Western Canada.
While 235,000 Atlantic NDP voters elected no one, so did 249,000 Atlantic Conservative voters and 384,000 Alberta Liberals.
Across Canada, 8,921,682 votes were ineffective. That’s 50.7% of all votes cast.
But the majority of those disregarded votes were for Liberals and Conservatives: 30% for Conservatives and 26% for Liberals, while 29% were for NDP candidates, 7% for the Bloc Quebecois, and 6% for the Greens."

(End Quote)

My response to Wilfred Day: While all of this is true, the national averages, as opposed to regional data, shown in the graph above, speaks for itself. In the national average, it is generally* the smaller parties who lose the most in ANY country that uses the "First Past The Post" voting system. In Canada's case, it's the NDP and Greens who generally* lose most.

* Parties that have voters dispersed across many ridings/regions are worse off than parties (such as the Bloc) which are not dispersed. 



Wednesday, July 19, 2023

Part 2 of: A Shared Commitment to Fairness: Fair Vote Canada and the Charter Challenge for Fair Voting

(This is a continuation of Part 1 at this link.)

Both Fair Vote Canada and the Charter Challenge for Fair Voting have long pointed to the fact that, quote, “in Canada’s current electoral system, the majority of voters cast ballots for a candidate who does not get elected.

In the next few months that statement/fact will become even more prominent in the work of both of those organizations.

That statement is found in MP Lisa Marie Barron’s Private Member’s motion, M-86, to establish a Citizens' Assembly on Electoral Reform. That motion is actively supported by Fair Vote Canada. See link.  It will be debated in the fall of 2023 and voted on either in the fall of 2023 or early 2024.

But even before that happens, the Charter Challenge for Fair Voting has a court date of Sep 26 in Toronto, and its case evidence also includes a variation of that same statement of fact.

[ UPDATE ]:

The case was first heard in the Ontario Superior Court from Sep 26-28, 2023. Justice Ed Morgan handed down his ruling on Nov 30, 2023.

Unfortunately, Justice Morgan dismissed our Application, so we filed a Notice of Appeal on Dec 29, 2023. That Notice of Appeal can be downloaded from the Charter Challenge "Appeal" web page which is at this link.

Why does M-86 allow the option of not reforming something that is so clearly unfair?

The first part of the M-86 motion describes an unfair situation in which “the majority of voters cast ballots for a candidate who does not get elected.”

Given the fact that other countries can do so much better, it seems obvious that this situation is in need of reform. Yet the last part of the motion then implies that this situation may, or may not be, in need of reform: It reads:
“(b) in the opinion of the House, the government should create a Canadian citizens’ assembly on electoral reform, which would,…
…(iii) determine if electoral reform is recommended for Canada, and, if so, recommend specific measures that would foster a healthier democracy."
End Quote

Notice the word “if.”

It’s reasonable to ask the Citizens’ Assembly to “recommend specific measures that would foster a healthier democracy,” but it seems odd to give the citizens’ assembly the option of not recommending to reform a situation in which “the majority of voters cast ballots for a candidate who does not get elected.”

Was this oddity in M-86 part of a strategy to make it less binding, less threatening and therefore more likely to pass?

In any case, because of this oddity in M-86, there is clearly a need for an additional impetus for change that is not found within M-86.

Additional Impetus for change

Additional impetus for change would come if the plans of the Charter Challenge for Fair Voting are successful in the following two goals: 1. the Supreme Court rules that our current voting system contravenes the Charter, and 2. the Supreme Court orders the government to adopt a voting system that complies with the Charter. 

If that happens then the Citizens Assembly would be obligated to “determine” that “electoral reform” is indeed “recommended for Canada.”  In that scenario, that obligation would likely be manifested through the power of the House of Commons instead of the courts. In other words, the act of setting up a Citizens Assembly in the first place would likely be a political decision by the House of Commons, not a legal decision that bypasses the House.

Could the Charter Challenge for Fair Voting work in Tandem with a Citizens’ Assembly on Electoral Reform?

Réal Lavergne, former President of Fair Vote Canada, presented that possibility on Feb 16, 2023 with this quote:

“And we’re hoping that the Supreme Court will pronounce itself on that and hopefully that the Supreme Court will say you have to find a way to hand this over to citizens and the Citizens’ Assembly would be one way to do it.” (1)

In that type of tandem effort it makes a lot of sense for Fair Vote Canada to push for a Citizens’ Assembly on Electoral Reform exactly at the same time as the Charter Challenge for Fair Voting pushes for a victory in the courts.


Footnotes:

Footnote 1:
Réal Lavergne’s quote is found here: “Advancing Proportional Representation in Canada” Stephan Kyburz interviews Réal Lavergne in this Feb 16, 2023 episode of “Rules of The Game: Discussing Democratic Institutions” Blog/Podcast  See this link 

Lavergne mentions that interview on his Facebook page Feb 16, 2023 (See this link): Here I paraphrase his comments further in that Facebook thread:

It would be valuable if we could get the courts to say that it was largely politics and partisan interests that have prevented the adoption of electoral reform. If the courts say that then that would be a reason for them NOT to give the decision on electoral reform to the government in power.

If the courts do rule that the existing electoral system needs to be overhauled, then to develop a new system… “some sort of independent process is required and there needs to be a way to ensure that independence, based on multi-party or all-party support.” “So, [it should be] either a Citizens Assembly or some other form of citizen-based process that is unassailable.”


Saturday, June 3, 2023

Countries With Proportional Electoral Systems Have Lower Levels Of Income Inequality

Evidence that countries with proportional electoral systems have lower levels of income inequality has been compiled by Fair Vote Canada on their Evidence webpage at this link.  The below is an excerpt/quote from that webpage:


Income Inequality


Lijphart (2012: 282) found that countries with proportional systems had considerably lower levels of income inequality.


Likewise, Birchfield and Crepaz (1998:192) found that “consensual political institutions [which use PR] tend to reduce income inequalities whereas majoritarian institutions have the opposite effect.” The results of the regression work they present were highly significant, with PR accounting for 51% of the variance in income inequality across countries. Birchfield and Crepaz explain this result in terms of the higher degree of political power of people in PR systems. In their words (1998:191):


“The more widespread the access to political institutions, and the more representative the political system, the more citizens will take part in the political process to change it in their favour which will manifest itself, among other things, in lower income inequality. Such consensual political institutions make the government more responsive to the demands of a wider range of citizens.”


Vincenzo Verardi, in a study of 28 democracies (2005), also found that when proportionality increases, inequality decreases. Iversen and Soskice (2006) found that PR is associated with greater efforts to promote income redistribution.


Bernauer, Giger and Rosset (2015) looking at 24 Parliamentary democracies, found that the political preferences of low income citizens are better represented in a more proportional system, and the political preferences of the rich are better represented in a winner-take-all system.


Footnotes:


Lijphart, Arend (2012). Patterns of Democracy. Government Forms and Performance in 36 Countries. New Haven, CT: Yale Press.


Birchfield, Vicki and Crepaz, Markus (1998). “The Impact of Constitutional Structures and Collective and Competitive Veto Points on Income Inequality in Industrialized Democracies.” European Journal of Political Research 34: 175-200.


Verardi, Vincenzo (January 2005). ”Electoral Systems and Income Inequality.” Economics Letters, 86-1: 7-12.


Iversen, T., & Soskice, D. (2006). “Electoral Systems and the Politics of Coalitions: Why Some Democracies Redistribute More Than Others". American Political Science Review 100-2: 165–81.

Bernauer, Giger and Rosset (2015). “Mind the gap: Do proportional electoral systems foster a more equal representation of men and women, poor and rich?” International Political Science Review. 36-1: 78-98.



 

Thursday, May 11, 2023

Trudeau, and the Liberal Party on Electoral Reform, May 10 2023


 

On May 10, 2023 in Parliament:
See this video at 15:21:30

Mike Morrice: “Mr. Speaker Canadians overwhelming support creating a Citizens Assembly on Electoral Reform. This past weekend, Liberal Party members strongly voted in support of it, too. Yet the Prime Minister won’t make electoral reform a priority. So, if not Canadians, and if not his own party, who else does the Prime Minister need to hear from before he’s ready to act?”


Justin Trudeau: “Mr. Speaker, as Members of this House know, I’m committed and continue to be hopeful about replacing the First Past the Post system with a preferential ballot. I moved forward in 2015 to live up to that promise and to find consensus in this House of Commons because when you change something as fundamental as the way we elect this House it has to be done with consensus. Unfortunately there was no consensus on moving forward with a ranked ballot therefore we chose not to do it. I continue to be open. If anyone wants to move forward with a preferential ballot I’m happy to talk with them but we will not impose a change on Canadians.”


Fact check (See source below): 

First, Trudeau speaks of "replacing the First Past the Post system with a preferential ballot." In the next sentence he refers to "[moving] forward in 2015 to live up to that promise."

What exactly was "that" 2015 promise? Was it, as he said, to "[replace] the First Past the Post system with a preferential ballot?"

No.

Instead, the Liberal 2015 platform promised an all-party committee to (quote) "review a wide variety of reforms, such as ranked ballots, proportional representation, mandatory voting . . ."
Notice the words “ranked ballots” are separated by a comma before the words “proportional representation.”
See pg 27 in this document (download PDF): Click Here or copy and paste the below link into your browser:
https://liberal.ca/wp-content/uploads/sites/292/2020/09/New-plan-for-a-strong-middle-class.pdf?
 

Sunday, April 30, 2023

Ask Yourself Seven Questions about Trudeau’s Statement that Proportional Representation Causes Division


 On June 6, 2022, Justin Trudeau said, “Anywhere we see proportional representation it is a recipe for divisive and regional outcomes that don't make for stable approaches.” (See 22:47 in this video)

Ask yourself seven questions about that statement (Notice the ones further down the list that get less attention):

1.    Is the alternative that Trudeau suggests better or worse than our current electoral system?
2.    Does our current electoral system produce outcomes which then lead to more division and instability than systems based on proportional representation?
3.    Does DISproportional representation meet the definition of representative democracy better than proportional representation?
4.    Is the task of “developing unity” within the scope of the function of elections?
5.     Will the task of “developing unity” be better served after elections which produce DISproportional representation rather than proportional representation?
6.    Is it necessary to establish Truth before Reconciliation?
7.    Is that “Truth” (ie. “the will of the people”) better reflected with better voter equality (ie. the voter equality that accompanies proportional representation)?

First: Is the alternative he suggests better or worse than our current electoral system?


Trudeau suggests an alternative electoral system which uses ranked ballots in single member ridings. But it is just another winner-take-all system. All winner-take-all systems share the same flaws as we see below. Ranked ballots in single member ridings produce results which are less representative of the “will of the people” than our current system, as evidenced by the Gallagher Index.

Second: Is our current system more “divisive” and “unstable” than proportional representation?

There is much evidence that our current system produces outcomes which then lead to more division and instability than electoral systems based on proportional representation: See this Fair Vote Canada link.

In terms of “stability,” a shortcoming of all winner-take-all electoral systems (relative to proportional systems) is that relatively small shifts in voting preferences are sufficient to generate large shifts in power, which more often results in policy lurches when a government changes.

In terms of “regional outcomes,” a shortcoming of winner-take-all systems (relative to proportional systems) is that they often create the false impression that an entire region voted unanimously for only the party of all the winners of winner-take-all ridings of that particular region.

For example in the 2019 federal election, despite political diversity in Alberta and Saskatchewan, voters of parties other than the Conservatives received almost no representation. See link.

In addition to robbing some voters of their rightful representation and being only partially representative of the will of the people within that region, this creates an illusory demarcation of that region from a national perspective.

Third: Does DISproportional representation meet the definition of representative democracy better than proportional representation?

A good camera will take photos that are an accurate representation of reality. A good election is similar. Neither a camera nor an election should distort reality. Both should show the proper proportions of reality.

Distortion happens when voters vote “strategically,” meaning that voters vote keep a candidate out rather than elect their desired candidate. That happens much more with winner-take-all electoral systems than with systems based on proportional representation: Proportional systems ensure that the percentage of seats a party gets will come very close to the percentage of votes they got regardless of the results of any individual riding. 

Ideally in a “representative democracy” such as ours, we should elect representatives to represent our desired candidates. If that representative democracy uses an electoral system that is better at being representative of that then it’s better at being a representative democracy. If the representatives are elected in proportion to the people who voted for them then the result is a better representation of the voters.

That’s what an election is for, first and foremost.

Can we expect an election to, by itself, create unity?

No. We can’t expect an election to create unity in society anymore than we can expect a camera to stitch together a quilt. It’s simply the wrong tool for the task at hand. 

First an electoral system facilitates an election “outcome.” If that outcome reveals regional divisions or other divisions that create a risk for instability, then we need tools other than elections to deal with those problems. 

Fourth: Is the task of “developing unity” within the scope of the function of elections?

The scope of the mechanical function of an individual election is much narrower than the scope of the project of developing unity in society.

Developing unity in society is much more complex than the simple function of holding an election: Unity development can use tools like diplomacy, negotiation, finding common ground, etc. But a good election is not one of those tools. The function of elections in representative democracies is simply to choose representatives that come as close as possible to matching people’s votes. Therefore electoral systems and the “outcomes” of elections should be assessed on how well that outcome represents voters. That purpose is inside their scope. However it is outside the scope of the mechanics of elections and electoral systems to assess them on how well they develop unity in society.

Fifth: Will the task of “developing unity” be better served after elections which produce DISproportional representation rather than proportional representation?

Let’s examine the fears the Trudeau expressed about regional divisions or other divisions that risk instability.

Before you can start on the project of unity and reconciliation you need truth. 

The function of an election is to tell the truth about what representatives the voters want. First you need that truth before you can begin any project of reconciliation. Honesty must precede dialogue.

The truth of what people are trying to express with their vote can only be the “whole truth” if you allow every individual voter in the whole population to have a vote that is equally effective on the outcome.
Establishing the “whole truth” entails doing our best towards universal voter equality.

If during your first step you distort the will of the people with disproportional representation and an unrepresentative election then your later attempts at reconciliation will fail. 

If you choose an electoral system to try to distort the will of the people and make it produce outcomes which are disproportionate to what voters want, and if you do so even before you have even seen the true will of the people, then that disproportionate distortion is not a good foundation for the later attempts at dialogue, diplomacy and reconciliation. Those who have been treated unequally will not want to carry on a conversation that started based on inequality.

First we must allow the voice of all the people to be equally and proportionately heard through a proportional election, and then, once they have all been equally heard and acknowledged, only then can an honest conversation begin in the spirit of mutual respect for each other’s equality.

If you begin by denying a large proportion of the population the right to express themselves in an election then this is not a foundation for a dialogue of mutual respect. That mutual respect comes from everyone being treated as equals when they vote. 

We need voter equality first. That equality comes from applying the Golden Rule of Reciprocity to our electoral systems. Treat others as you want to be treated.

The function of an election is to recognize and acknowledge what voters are trying to say before you begin the process of negotiation. That “recognition and acknowledgement” stage is a crucial step that must precede any negotiation or compromise dialogue. 

That sequence is important in conversations of all types.  To develop initial trust, first the voices in a conversation must be equally acknowledged, heard, listened to, and recognized. It’s only after that foundation of equal respect has been given that a conversation can then proceed with all parties on an equal footing.

If that first step (ie an election) leaves half the voters without a voice and without a representative that they voted for, then that first stage is not good enough at respecting everyone as equals. That is what happens with the First Past the Post electoral system. See link.

Also, if you use that first step (ie. an election) to try to corral everyone into only two “big tent” parties, then that is a manipulative abuse of that first step. It is not a genuine acknowledgement of all equal voices in a conversation. The act of corralling everyone into two “big tent” parties is effectively what happens in electoral systems with ranked ballots in single member ridings (which is just another winner-take-all system). See link.

On the other hand, the phrase “proportional representation” refers to the best effort at recognizing voter equality. That commitment to a mutual recognition of each other’s equality is the best and the most stable foundation for any future attempts at negotiation and cooperation. That’s one of the main things that lays the groundwork for genuine long term stability.

Footnote: Ranked ballots can be used to produce proportional results IF the ridings have multi members. See this link on Proportional Ranked Choice Voting. (STV) (from Fair Vote Canada)

Tuesday, April 11, 2023

Proportional Representation and Public School Curriculum

If public schools would shoulder more of the responsibility to educate students about electoral systems then graduates of those schools might not be so easily fooled by people who purposely manipulate the public’s lack of knowledge of electoral systems.

  
Often the public must be first educated on various electoral systems before they can clearly recognize the unfairness of Canada’s electoral system, and be motivated to change it. Therefore, if public schools would shoulder more of that education responsibility, then that would reduce the burden of work for advocates of electoral reform: It would free up more of their time and money to focus on things like reform advocacy (ie. Fair Vote Canada), and the Charter Challenge for Fair Voting.
 
How is the curriculum developed? (Education is the jurisdiction of provincial governments.) If there is a certain government in power with a certain agenda, can a public school curriculum be politicized?

 
Good question: In 2015, the Ontario Progressive Conservatives criticized a certain sex education curriculum as ideological and later scrapped it when they formed government in 2018. Parents will now be able to exempt children from some of Ontario's new sex-ed curriculum. (Nevertheless that new curriculum is similar to the 2015 version.) See link.

So how much do public schools teach about electoral systems?


Here is some research into the current Ontario Secondary School curriculum called “Canadian and World Studies”:


At this link look at the left sidebar, see PDFs.

PDF: Grade 10 CHV2O – Civics and Citizenship (compulsory course):


Main Heading: B: Civic Awareness; Subheading: B2. Canadian and Indigenous Governance Systems


Pg 13: B2.8: “[By the end of this course, students will…] demonstrate an understanding of the electoral process”


PDF: Ontario Curriculum, Grade 9 and 10:


Main heading: A - Political Inquiry and Skill Development; Sub heading: A1 – Political Inquiry


Pg 158: A1.7 [Assignment (optional topic ideas)]: “…a debate on alternative electoral processes…”


Main Heading: B - Civic Awareness; Sub heading: B2 - Governance in Canada:


Pg 161, 162: 

B1.4 - communicate their own position on some issues of civic importance at the local, national, and/or global level (e.g.,….electoral reform…)
B2.5 - identify Canada’s form of government and demonstrate an understanding of the process of electing governments in Canada (e.g., the first-past-the-post electoral system)……“Why does the popular vote not always give a clear indication of the number of seats won by the parties?”

 
PDF: Ontario Curriculum: Grade 11 and 12 (not compulsory):
The words “proportional representation” are found in these two places:


Main heading: E. Rights And Power In The International Community; Sub heading: E.1: Influence, power, and decision making:


Page 540: E1.4 Explain the requirements for a democracy, and describe the characteristics and the strengths and weaknesses of different types of electoral systems used in democratic states (e.g., single-member plurality, proportional representation, run-off systems)…. Why are some groups trying to introduce proportional representation to Canadian electoral politics?


Pg 568 (Glossary):


proportional representation. A voting system in which the number of seats held by each party is in proportion to the number of votes each party received, rather than, as in a single member plurality, the number of ridings won by each party.


Here’s another possibly relevant point that relates to the Charter Challenge for Fair Voting:

p 456, Human Rights: “Which Charter right ensures that Canadians have the opportunity to participate in regular elections?”


I’ll close with this question: Are other provinces doing better or worse than Ontario on this? Could other provinces learn from this Ontario curriculum?

Tuesday, March 14, 2023

Proportional Ranked Choice Voting Made Easy

I'm green with envy at the Irish voting system.

The “Proportional Ranked Choice Voting” electoral system is sometimes called “Single Transferable Vote.” The feature that makes this type of ranked choice voting into “proportional voting” is the fact that each riding ends up with a “multi-member” team of winners instead of a “single-member” winner-take-all.


Creating these “multi-member” ridings in Canada would simply mean the old single-member ridings would be combined and the enlarged riding would elect a small team of MPs. Learn more at this Fair Vote Canada link.  

 
Below is a transcript of a Fair Vote Canada video that describes this electoral system in only about one minute! Watch it at this link..as you follow the below transcript:


"In this simplified version, there are three seats available and five candidates running for election.

 
The quota is three thousand: This is how many votes each candidate will need to win.

After counting the first preferences marked in the ballots, Lauren has enough votes to be elected.

In fact she has more votes than she needs: She has a surplus.

This surplus is then transferred to the candidates ranked as “second favoured” on her ballots.

Now Fergus has enough votes to win the second seat.

So if any of his voters marked a three next to a candidate’s name, they get these extra votes.
 
But look: none of the candidates have enough votes to win the next seat.
So the least popular candidate with the fewest votes, Ella, is eliminated.

Her ballots are redistributed to the remaining two candidates based on the voter’s preferences.

Now Sean has enough votes to be elected to the next seat."

Footnote:

Remember there are six seats to fill per constituency in the Northern Ireland Assembly elections.

The benefit of the STV method is that the majority of voters will have at least one of their choices get elected. So with STV each vote really is powerful and can make a big difference.

Learn more at this Fair Vote Canada link.

Saturday, March 4, 2023

Table of Contents & Links

Charter Challenge for Fair Voting

Fair Vote Canada

A Shared Commitment to Fairness: Fair Vote Canada and Charter Challenge for Fair Voting  

Part 2 of: A Shared Commitment to Fairness: Fair Vote Canada and the Charter Challenge for Fair Voting 

Make Votes Equal Website

Make Votes Equal on Facebook

Make Votes Equal on Twitter 

Make Votes Equal Mission Statement 


Best Posts:

Exploring Strengths in The Charter Challenge for Fair Voting and the Affidavit of Antony Hodgson 

How the Charter Challenge for Fair Voting case differs from the 2012 Gibb vs Quebec case

Should the Charter Challenge for Fair Voting be worried about the Supreme Court 2014 ruling on Senate Reform? 

Timeline scenarios for Charter Challenge 

Canada’s Charter Challenge for Fair Voting and the Urgent Climate Clock

Wasted Votes – an informal, but important, phrase 

Translating and Assessing Christopher Kam’s blog post on The Representation-Accountability Trade-Off in Electoral Systems

Critiquing Christopher Kam’s critique of Proportional Representation regarding False Majorities


Mission Statement of Make Votes Equal

We aim to “Make Votes Equal” in their effect on election results in Canada and its provinces.

About the “aim”: Even though it’s technically impossible for any electoral system to makes all votes precisely mathematically equal, the phrase “Make Votes Equal” still expresses a desire, a direction, an ideal to aim towards, a moral value, a governing guide and governing principle which ought to be used when developing an electoral system. (See footnote 1)

A similar governing guide, “equal treatment,” is expressed in Section 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

“Equal treatment” is also mentioned by both the Charter Challenge for Fair Voting and Fair Vote Canada: The Charter Challenge for Fair Voting is based, in part, on Section 15, the right to “equal treatment.” (See link) Also, the first sentence of the Fair Vote Canada Statement of Purpose, also speaks of “the right of each citizen to equal treatment under election laws and equal representation in legislatures.” (footnote 2) 

As an independent group, Make Votes Equal endorses both those organizations.

History:
In late Jan 2023, a group of people interested in the above mission participated in a poll to name this independent group, “Make Votes Equal.”

Footnote 1:  Here's a more nuanced expression of "voter equality": In the [1991] Saskatchewan Electoral Boundaries Reference [on the sizes of riding populations], the Supreme Court of Canada concluded (at p 183) that the first condition of effective representation is “relative parity of voting power.” (See Section 3 of the Charter of Rights at this link.)

Footnote 2: At the Fair Vote Canada site, hover over “About Us” and choose “Statement of Purpose” (PDF) 



Sunday, February 19, 2023

Exploring Strengths in The Charter Challenge for Fair Voting's Affidavit of Antony Hodgson

A Compilation of Key Excerpts (with Editor's Notes by Boyd Reimer)

(This post is duplicated in a Google doc at this link.)

Why a Charter Challenge:

Quote from the Charter Challenge for Fair Voting website: 

“The Charter guarantees our right to vote and our right to equal treatment. It's up to the Supreme Court to decide when this principle has been violated…. 

 “Each citizen is entitled to be represented in government.” – Justice Beverly McLachlin  

That’s each of us, not just some of us. That principle has been upheld in several cases throughout Canadian elections. 

The court has also said that voters should be treated equally, but when only half of us have an MP we support, the system is discriminatory and excludes those voices. [Countries with electoral systems based on proportional representation do much better in terms of voter equality (see evidence below).]

Constitutional lawyers have advised us that we have a worthwhile case to make against our current voting system on these grounds.

Why not change the system through political channels? 

Governments of various stripes have supported electoral reform while in opposition, and on the campaign trail only to back away from the promise of reform once elected.

The present government and parliament have decided not to proceed with electoral reform. It could be years, or decades, and several elections, before electoral reform becomes a possibility again. Democratic rights are human rights. It's the Supreme Court's job to ensure that those rights are protected when parliament neglects to protect them.”

End Quote from the Charter Challenge for Fair Voting website:

Editor's Note: How to make a strong case in a Charter Challenge

The Charter guarantees rights to individual citizens; not political parties. Therefore a successful Charter Challenge for Fair Voting must show how our current electoral system violates the Charter rights of individual citizens -- not political parties. (1)

“But,” you may be asking, “has the Supreme Court already made a previous ruling about fair voting and fair representation of individuals? In other words, do we have a pre-existing precedent and thereby have a much stronger foundation upon which to build our case?”

The answer is “yes!”

Here’s a quote from the Supreme Court of Canada (1991 Saskatchewan Election Boundaries Reference, p 183). (This ruling is about the sizes of riding populations):

“[The result of] a system which dilutes one citizen’s vote unduly as compared with another citizen’s … will be uneven and unfair representation.”

The above 1991 quote, among other things, provided Antony Hodgson with a strong foundation to submit an affidavit as evidence in the case.

That key affidavit is explored below.

Editor's Note: A remarkable finding of the Affidavit of Antony Hodgson

Before we explore that affidavit in detail, here’s one of its most remarkable findings:


Unfortunately, in recent decades our electoral system is still allowing for differences in voter power that are five times greater than those 1991 allowable differences in voter power due to the sizes of riding populations (see evidence below).

This means that, in terms of voter equality, one part of our democratic process (our electoral system) is five times worse than another part (differences allowed in sizes of riding populations).

If voter equality is like a chain then it’s only as strong as its weakest link. The weaker link in this case is our electoral system--as the below measurements and evidence show.

A weakness in voter equality is detrimental because the validity of our democracy depends on the strength of its voter equality.

If the validity of our democracy is like a chain then it’s only as strong as its weakest link. In Canada’s case, a weak link is a relatively low level of voter equality in our electoral system--as the below measurements and evidence show.

Photo credit: capacityllc.com

Digesting Excerpts from the Affidavit of Antony Hodgson to the Charter Challenge for Fair Voting case

The Affidavit PDF is available for download from this link (See “Fair Voting BC”): 

Quotes, paraphrases, and sources from that affidavit are noted in the below  “Excerpt Compilation Article” in parentheses (), and/or footnoted. Underlined emphasis is my own (ie Boyd Reimer).

Introductory Synopsis:

 In the [1991] Saskatchewan Electoral Boundaries Reference [on the sizes of riding populations], the Supreme Court of Canada concluded (at p 183) that the first condition of effective representation is “relative parity of voting power.” The court argued that dilution of voting power is problematic because it reduces the legislative power of the citizen and access to and assistance from his or her representative. In their words:

 “A system which dilutes one citizen’s vote unduly as compared with another citizen’s vote runs the risk of providing inadequate representation to the citizen whose vote is diluted. The legislative power of the citizen whose vote is diluted will be reduced, as may be access to and assistance from his or her representative. The result will be uneven and unfair representation.” (Pg 29, par 63)

This previous Supreme Court ruling on citizens’ “legislative power” as it pertains to electoral boundaries can be used as a point of comparison to show that Canada’s electoral system is not as fair in the distribution of legislative power to individual citizens as when we compare it with the electoral systems of countries with proportional representation.

When we use something called the “Legislative Power Share score” to precisely and mathematically measure and compare the different degrees of “legislative power” that different citizens have within our electoral system... we find that “the [difference and] disparity in Legislative Power Share scores in recent decades has typically been over five times higher than the disparity allowed by the courts in the sizes of riding populations.” (Pg 56, par 101)

What exactly is a “Legislative Power Share score” and how does it precisely and mathematically measure and compare the different degrees of “legislative power” that different citizens have within our electoral system?

Let’s answer that by taking a deeper dive into the “Parity in Legislative Power” project carried out by Antony Hodgson when he prepared his Affidavit for the Charter Challenge for Fair Voting.

First, notice that parity of voting power is a phrase taken directly from the above-mentioned precedent ruling of the Supreme Court.

The the Affidavit of Antony Hodgson defines and summarizes three “indices,” which are “measurements,” or “metrics,” in the following way (pg 33, par 71):

 1. The Representation Metric (RM) - the percentage of voters who are represented by an MP for whom they voted;

 2. The Legislative Power Share (LPS) Score - the share of legislative voting power held by individual voters relative to their ‘fair share’ (parity)

 3. The Legislative Power Disparity Index (LPDI) - The distribution of legislative power amongst voters. (It summarizes the integrated impact and effect of disparities in legislative power that are felt and measured at the individual voter level by the Legislative Power Share score.)

[End of Synopsis]

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A Deeper Dive…

… into the Affidavit of Antony Hodgson's measurement of the Legislative Power of Individuals:

(Below excerpts compiled by Boyd Reimer)(3)

1. The Representation Metric (or “measurement”) identifies the percentage of voters who are represented by an MP for whom they voted. If the votes of all voters counted towards electing an MP, the Representation Metric would be 100%. (pg 35, par 73) The below comparison chart (Figure 11) is taken from pg. 40:

Figure 11. Representation Metrics for Canada (2019 federal election) and two recent elections in each of three selected countries using proportional voting (to demonstrate consistency of findings). The solid colours represent those voters who are represented by a representative for whom they have explicitly voted (‘direct’ representation), while the shaded colours represent those voters who are represented by a representative who won a seat by virtue of votes cast for the representative’s party (‘indirect’ representation). Norway uses a List PR system with 19 compensatory seats out of 169 seats total, Ireland uses a Single Transferable Voting System, and New Zealand uses a Mixed Member Proportional system. The two systems that use multi-member regions (Norway and Ireland) have similarly high levels of direct representation, while New Zealand has a level of direct representation similar to that of Canada due to its use of single member districts. The two systems that have a national compensatory element (Norway and New Zealand) have similarly high levels of total representation.

2. Legislative Power Share (LPS) Score (pg 40): measures the share of legislative voting power that individual voters hold compared to other voters in Canada (their ‘fair share’ or 'parity'). (pg 41, par 78)

Did You Vote For Your MP Or Not?:

Pg 41, par 79: Each of Canada’s 338 MPs holds an equal share of legislative power in the Canadian Parliament. If a voter did not vote for their elected MP, this voter had no influence on the ability of the MP to exercise legislative power (and their MP did not rely on their vote). We therefore assign this voter a Legislative Power Share score of zero.

On the other hand, if a voter voted for their elected MP, the voter’s share of the MP’s legislative power depends on how many other voters in the riding also voted for the MP.

The Scores Of Those Who Did Vote For Their MP Are Calculated As Follows:

Pg 42, par 81: To determine the “legislative power share” of a voter who voted for their MP, we divide the average number of votes cast per seat in that voter’s riding by the number of votes received by the elected MP. 

We then apply a weighting factor to adjust the share of each voter’s legislative power depending on whether the total number of voters in the riding was greater or smaller than in other ridings (since voters in ridings with fewer voters have more impact on the election of an MP than voters in ridings with more voters).

An Amplified Voice Or A Diminished Voice Are The Effects Of Deviating From A Representation Of “1”:

Ideally, if each voter had equal influence on the makeup of the legislature, then every voter would have a Legislative Power Share score of 1. If a voter’s Legislative Power Share score is greater than 1, that voter effectively has their voice in Parliament amplified relative to the average voter. Conversely, if a voter has a Legislative Power Share score of less than 1, then that voter has a diminished or diluted voice in Parliament. The relative representation of different voters becomes more uneven and unfair the more the distribution of LPS scores deviates from a uniform value of 1.

Pg 44: Figure 12: “Legislative Power Share” (LPS) Score Range in the 2019 Canadian federal election

 


Figure 12. Histogram of Legislative Power Share scores in the 2019 Canadian federal election. Scores closer to the parity value of 1 are shown in green, while scores further away are shown in shades of yellow and red. The sum of all bars in the histogram is 100%.

Pg 48, Figure 14: Percentage of Voters with Various LPS Scores – comparing Canada to Countries with proportional representation

 

Figure 14. Distributions in Legislative Power Share scores in Canada’s 2019 federal election and in recent elections in three selected countries using proportional voting systems.

The next chart, Figure 15 is basically an excerpt from the above chart. (pg 50)

Figure 15. Percentage of voters with a Legislative Power Share score within +/-10% (dark green), +/- 25% (dark green + light green) and +/-50% (dark green + light green + yellow) of parity (colours correspond to previous chart). All comparator countries have at least two-thirds of voters with LPS scores within +/-50% of 1 (ranging from 67-92%), while Canada has fewer than 10% of voters within that margin.

3. Legislative Power Disparity Index: The distribution of legislative power amongst voters. (pg 50)

To understand that concept simply look at the below Figure 16 (pg 51), keeping in mind that the bars at either end (sides) of the plot show the shares we would expect if legislative power were distributed equitably. In other words, the black line across is the benchmark of uniform equality:


Figure 16. Distribution of Legislative Power Shares across different segments of the voters for all federal elections in Canada since Confederation. The share of legislative power held by the bottom 50% of voters is shown in grey, the next 40% in orange, and the top 10% in red. The bars at either end (sides) of the plot show the shares we would expect if legislative power were distributed equitably.

Pg 51, par 92: In a voting system with perfect legislative power parity, the legislative power shares would be distributed evenly across all voters (as in the separated bars at either side of the figure above). In Canadian elections, however, the 10% of voters with the greatest legislative power scores have consistently held close to 25% of the legislative voting power. The next 40% of voters have consistently held most of the remaining 75% of legislative voting power while the bottom 50% of voters have often held no legislative voting power at all in the past 60 years.

The disparity in legislative power between voters in Canadian elections illustrated above can be more precisely visualized and quantified using tools drawn from the political science and economics literature. In this literature, the Gini coefficient is a commonly-used index to measure disparity in the distribution of a property (e.g., income or wealth); here we use it to measure disparity in the distribution of Legislative Power Share scores. It is calculated by plotting the cumulative percentage of the property against the percentage of the population that holds that percentage of property, ordered from those holding the least of the property to the most (this is known as a Lorenz curve).

[(Ed. note: But since the charts --both above and below-- are visually self explanatory it’s not absolutely necessary to fully comprehend that they show the “Gini coefficient,” or “Lorenz curve.”)]

Pg 52, par 94: The chart below (Figure 17) illustrates Lorenz curves for four elections – one from Canada and one for each of the three example countries using proportional voting systems. In each plot, the blue line indicates an equitable distribution of legislative power - i.e., each voter holding equal shares. The red line is the Lorenz curve, which shows the cumulative shares of legislative power held by the percentage of voters on the horizontal axis.

In an election with an equitable distribution of legislative power (i.e., where each voter equally contributed to the election of an MP), the two lines would coincide. In contrast, increasing deviations between the red and blue lines indicate increasing inequities in the distribution of legislative power in the election.

Figure 17 (Pg 53) (LPS = Legislative Power Share):