Purpose of the Right to Vote Not Protected Says Court Ruling

Preface:

If the purpose of the right to vote in Canada is not protected by our constitution then how close are we to sham elections in our future?

On Aug 11 2025 a court ruling stated (par 29, 30): “Justice McLachlin described effective representation as a freestanding right, rather than simply the purpose of the right to vote…In doing so she merged conceptually distinct concepts: rights, which are constitutionally protected, and the purpose of particular constitutionally protected rights, which is not.”

I had to blink and read that again when I first saw it:

In a discussion of the Canadian Charter right to vote (Section 3), that ruling stated that the purpose of the right to vote is not constitutionally protected.

If the purpose of the right to vote in Canada is not protected by our constitution then how serious are the implications?

Let us remind ourselves that some countries do have sham elections, where people go through the motions of voting but their vote doesn’t mean anything.

So how much does our vote mean in Canada?

Some people would say that in Canada we have always had something that is too close to being like sham elections. These people point to what they call “Canada’s false majorities,” when a party can get a majority of seats with only a minority of the popular vote.

So, what exactly is a sham election?

Did this latest court ruling put us closer to it or farther from it in Canada?

Is the purpose of the right to vote related to having a fair vote?

If not, then what is the purpose of the right to vote?

For all of us who care about democracy we should all be paying attention because right now there is a case going through our courts that appears to be a struggle to define the purpose of the right to vote in Canada.

Synopsis:

On Aug 11 2025 the Ontario Court of Appeal's decision dismissed the appeal of Fair Voting BC v Canada (commonly known as the Charter Challenge for Fair Voting). Two judges (Huscroft J.A. and Trotter J.A.) wrote a majority opinion, and the third (Dawe J.A.) concurred in the decision to dismiss the appeal, but disagreed about some of the reasoning.

Because of this, the appellant, Fair Voting BC, needs to seek leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada.

Nevertheless, here’s why I believe that this case stands a good chance of eventually being successful in important ways.

Justice Dawe’s critique of the majority interpretation of section 3 of the Charter (the right to vote) calls into question the rationale they use to dismiss the appeal. But there is evidence (below) that Justice Dawe does not replace that rationale with a sufficiently ironclad alternative rationale of his own. His rationale, too, is also subject to significant critique as you’ll see in the evidence below.

Therefore, in my view, the weakness of all three of the judges’ arguments shows that there are ample grounds for appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada.

First, by way of clarification:

This blog post mainly deals with, Section 3 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. It reads: “Every citizen of Canada has the right to vote in an election of members of the House of Commons or of a legislative assembly and to be qualified for membership therein.”
 
Second, let’s look at Justice Dawe’s ruling:

On the one hand, Justice Dawe emphasizes the below quote from McLachlin in the Saskatchewan Boundaries Reference.

Quote:
p. 185, that:
"[D]eviations from absolute voter parity may be justified on the grounds of practical impossibility or the provision of more effective representation. Beyond this, dilution of one citizen’s vote as compared with another’s should not be countenanced. [Emphasis added [by Justice Dawe].]"
End quote

On the other hand, Justice Dawe’s next paragraph (103) implies that those “practical impossibilities” extend to all electoral systems to the same degree. With the below quote he appears to erroneously lump together all electoral systems by using the word “all.”

“To the contrary, I am satisfied that legislatures have considerable leeway to choose between a wide range of different electoral models that all provide effective representation and “meaningful participation” in the electoral process to a sufficient extent to meet the demands of s. 3.”

The word “all” is categorical.

On the other hand, the McLachlin phrase, “more effective representation” implies that “effective representation” is relative; not categorical nor absolute.

The word, “more” implies that in the phrase “effective representation,” the adjective “effective” is relative. That is to say the representation in question can be “more” effective, or less effective. It’s a matter of degree. It is not a categorical absolute matter of an electoral system being demarcated as either “effective” or “not effective.”

Here is only some of the evidence that some electoral systems consistently provide representation that is “more” effective than other electoral systems:

The appellant, Fair Voting BC, previously presented the 2004 Law Commission as evidence. That Commission was referred to by Prof. Larry LeDuc (an expert for the Applicants on “Electoral Systems” and “Political Behaviour”) in the first Factum of the Applicants: Par 11 mentions the Commission’s report, “Voting Counts: Electoral Reform for Canada.”

The Commission states on pg 155: “…The new system would be fairer; it would be more representative of our society; it would be more inclusive (in terms of smaller parties); it would reduce the number of disregarded votes; and it would make party caucuses in the House of Commons more representative of the various regions in the country. It could also help to increase voter turnout. For these reasons, a mixed member proportional electoral system meets, and indeed surpasses, any realistic test for proving the desirability of reform.” 

(Note: the mixed member proportional system is only one of several proportional systems. I give this particular example simply to show that proportional systems in general achieve more effective representation for voters.)

In terms of “reducing the number of disregarded votes,” Fair Voting BC also provided to the courts a method to quantify the “relative parity of voting power” that is discussed in the [1991] Saskatchewan Electoral Boundaries Reference. In that case the Supreme Court of Canada concluded (at p 183) that the first condition of effective representation is “relative parity of voting power.” (See Footnote 1)

That Law Commission quote above aligns with a “purposive” interpretation of section 3 of the Charter that is referred to in these quotes from Jim Young of the Centre for Constitutional Studies, below:

Quote One:
“A Literal Reading or Broad Reading
…In interpreting the content of section 3, courts have had to determine whether it should be read literally or purposively. That is, should the court adhere to a plain reading of section 3 or should it read in implicit restrictions and democratic ideals?”

Quote Two:
“Justice Cory…said, “[In] the interpretation of all enfranchising statutes the provisions granting the right to vote should be given a broad and liberal interpretation. Every effort should be made to interpret the statute to enfranchise the voter.””

The “new system” recommended by the 2004 Law Commission is one of several proportional electoral systems that does exactly that: It “enfranchises” “more” voters by “reducing the number of disregarded votes.”

Question: In the Aug 11 2025 ruling does Justice Dawe read section 3 literally or purposively?

Answer: Actually he appears to be doing both --in what appears to be an incongruent fashion: In his criticism of the majority opinion (par 101, 102) he appears to be reading the content of sec. 3 purposively, but in par 103, when he provides his own rationale for dismissing the appeal, he appears to be reading it literally.

In light of all of the above, in my view, Justice Dawe’s literal reading of sec. 3 may have, whether intentionally or not, caused him to appear to be misinterpreting Fair Voting BC’s argument:

As I understand it, Fair Voting BC’s argument was not that all voters categorically need to elect a representative to meet the requirement of sec 3. Instead that argument was that we need to make every effort to “enfranchise” “more” voters by “reducing the number of disregarded votes.” This means maximizing the number of voters who elect an MP. This would be an effort towards "the democratic ideal" of "more" “relative parity of voting power.” (See link) This effort is made when reading the content of sec. 3 purposively as opposed to literally.

In conclusion:

How important is this case?

I see it as an integral part of the struggle to define the purpose of the right to vote in Canada.

I believe this has huge implications as to whether we get closer to, or farther from sham elections in our future.

Is that important enough for you to support?

If so, I recommend supporting the grassroots supported Charter Challenge for Fair Voting. This effort would not be possible without your support --either financially, or simply by telling your friends about it.

Footnotes:

Footnote 1:

That 2004 Law Commission report did meet the legal requirements of being an “Expert Opinion” because it was written by a panel of experts lead by Nathalie Des Rosiers. Also see this link.  

The fact that the 2004 Law Commission report did meet that legal requirement perhaps makes it more admissible as evidence than Antony Hodgson’s affidavit. The status of Hodgson’s affidavit was questioned in the first hearing. There was debate about whether Hodgson was either an expert witness, or a fact witness, or neither.

Nevertheless his affidavit has never been struck down as inadmissible. If his affidavit is written about by an expert then the status of that affidavit could, in the future, still be elevated to be considered as coming from an expert witness.

The Hodgson affidavit quantifies the degree of the effectiveness of representation on the basis of “relative parity of voting power” See link.

Israel and proportional representation:

Some people say that they don’t want proportional representation because of the example of Israel:

We need to ask each of these individual people two questions:
1. What particular aspect of Israel’s situation is undesirable to you in particular?
2. Is that particular aspect caused by the electoral system? -- Or by something else?


For example, here are two aspects that likely have a more distant cause-and-effect relationship with the electoral system within Israel:
1. The history and premises of the formation of the state of Israel and the volatility that can create
2. Israel’s Occupation of Palestinian territories and the volatility that can create

Here are two other examples of aspects that should be examined as to whether or not they have a closer cause-and-effect relationship with the electoral system: 

1. The perceived instability of politics within Israel
2. The perceived control by small parties within Israel

Only after a discussion isolates the particular aspect of Israel’s situation that is undesirable to certain individual people, only then we can begin to examine whether or not that particular aspect has a cause-and-effect relationship with the electoral system and/or with any one of the particular features of Israel’s particular electoral system. 

Voter Equality (Relative Voter Parity) as a Fundamental Mathematical Principle of Equality and Fairness in a Democracy:

Proportional representation is a principle; it is not an electoral system itself.

It is the principle of a government representing voters in proportion to their vote.

In that respect, proportional representation is more fair than disproportional representation. That’s a mathematics-centered assessment of whether or not voters get represented equally and fairly.

This means that if there is any unfairness in Israel’s particular situation that is not caused by, or partially caused by, its electoral system, then that unfairness would be added to, compounded, and made worse if the electoral system were based on disproportional representation instead of proportional representation. If proportional representation was removed from Israel’s situation then there is a high probability that many of its particular problems would be worsened, not improved.

Obviously proportional representation is not the only ingredient needed to make things more fair. But it is definitely one of the necessary ingredients.

When an electoral system is designed using the principle of proportional representation that is one of the necessary ingredients of a truly representative democracy -- that is truly representative of it voters.

It’s like the ingredient of water in soup: You can’t have soup without it.

But if there are rocks in the soup you’ll still crack your teeth even if it has water.

There are several challenges facing Israel. With each one of these individual challenges, we have to ask ourselves, “Does that particular challenge have any relation to the electoral system?” “Is this particular challenge a function of the electoral system, or is it not a function of the electoral system?” To describe what it means for one thing to “be a function of” another thing, consider this analogy: Ringing a bicycle bell will not make the bicycle move forward. Therefore a bicycle’s movement is not a function of ringing the bell. In other words, a bicycle’s movement is has “no relation to” ringing the bell.

Other examples of improving election fairness that are not related to the electoral system would include:
1. enacting better rules on election spending,
2. political donations,
3. Media that is not dominated by too few voices: This facilitates informed voting.

Also there are other things apart from elections to foster fairness in between elections: For example: Improve rules on lobbying, transparency, diversity in media, media that is not beholden to their wealthy advertisers, etc.

 
Evidence, probabilities and correlations to Proportional Representation:

Internationally, there is much more evidence to support proportional representation (PR) than not.

Most nations with PR do better than Canada in several areas: environment, income inequality, etc. See link 

The evidence may not show that every single nation does better in these areas.

But in terms of overall, collective evidence and probability mathematics, the exceptions are less likely to occur. Unfortunately, cherry picking Israel focuses on one of those exceptions.

It’s counter to the logic of probability mathematics to cherry pick and selectively single out Israel as an example of what can go wrong with a country that chooses PR.

Again, we ask, “Are Israel’s problems caused by its electoral system or by something else?”

Once that is determined then we can begin to examine each particular design feature of Israel’s electoral system to see if it could be re-engineered and tweaked to reduce a particular ongoing problem.

For example, it could be the fact that their electoral party threshold has been relatively low for many years, or it could be that its closed list feature does not allow the voter to have enough power; or it could be a combination of those two and/or other features.

 
Israel’s Electoral Party Threshold is below average

From the perspective of global averages, Israel’s electoral party threshold has been relatively low for too many years, and is still below average even after they raised it several times.

The electoral threshold for a party to be allocated a Knesset seat was only 1% until 1988 (40 yrs); it was then raised to 1.5% and remained at that level until 2003 (15 yrs), when it was again raised to 2% (11 yrs). On 11 March 2014, the Knesset approved a new law to raise the threshold to 3.25% (approximately 4 seats).

Date	Time period	Israel’s Electoral Threshold (Most PR countries use 5%)
1948 – 1988	40 yrs	1%
1988 – 2003	15 yrs	1.5%
2003 – 2014	11 yrs	2%
2014 to present		3.25%

Source https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elections_in_Israel#History

Here are some of the thresholds used by other countries as of June 2024 (incomplete list of countries which use proportional representation). Notice that 19 countries have threshold at or below Israel’s; whereas 24 countries have a threshold above Israel’s.

Threshold (%)	0+	1+	2+	3+ Israel	4+	5+	6+	7+	8
Number of countries	8	-	3	8	7	14	1	1	1

Source https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Proportional_representation#List_of_countries_using_proportional_representation  

Israel has a closed list electoral system:

This puts the power of choosing candidates more into the hands of the party than of the voter.

Israel has a party-list electoral system:

Multiple candidates are elected through their position on an electoral list. Geographically and electorally speaking, Israel is organized as all one electoral district. That is unconstitutional in Canada which has provinces and local ridings.

See sources:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Party-list_proportional_representation

https://www.fairvote.ca/22/01/2020/what-about-israel/

  
Conclusion: 

When we separate, distinguish, and differentiate, the different cause-and-effect relationships, we can recognize which cause is related to which effect in Israel’s unique situation. 

Footnote:

Dennis Pilon has looked at two particular aspects of Israel’s electoral system. See link 

In terms of the perceived instability, he found that Israel is just as stable as Canada.

In terms of the perceived influence of small parties, he found that “dominant parties supplied the Prime Minister and all senior ministers while small parties were not able to exact much by way of concessions or cabinet posts.”

Nov 5 Update from the Charter Challenge for Fair Voting

Nov 5 Update email from the Charter Challenge for Fair Voting 

Quote:

"Today was our big day - we presented our appeal in the Court of Appeal for Ontario in front of a panel of three judges - Justices Grant Huscroft, Jonathan Dawe, and Gary Trotter. If you'd like see a play-by-play commentary of what went down, check out our tweets here.

Our "Hot Take" on What Happened

Our lawyer, Nicolas Rouleau, opened the day by laying out our argument for appeal. His main point was that the modern conception of democracy requires that voters have an elected representative aligned with their political views advocating for those views in Parliament, and our current system denies that to half the voters.

He also argued that many voters' right to meaningful participation is infringed by our current voting system because it discourages them from voting at all, or forces them to cast a strategic vote rather than one that honestly reflects their true preference.

He questioned whether the trial judge inappropriately considered possible "balancing" concerns (various supposed "strengths" of FPTP) before deciding whether FPTP infringes on our section 3 right to vote - these considerations are supposed to come in later, in what's known as a "section 1" analysis.

Nicolas then went on to outline reasons why the judge's reasoning about the impact on women's representation was incorrect - mainly that the judge found that the voting system is not the primary factor behind their under-representation in Canada, but Nicolas pointed out that the standard is simply that it has to be a contributing factor, and the evidence strongly supports that.

Nicolas advanced many other arguments, and one of the interveners supported our claim that political opinion should be considered a basis for protection from discrimination under section 15, in accordance with international law. Other interveners also spoke in support of many of Nicolas' arguments.

The government of course argued against all these points, and another intervener argued that FPTP is "constitutionalized" and therefore beyond the reach of the courts. Naturally we disagree.

The judge who chaired today (Huscroft) asked the majority of the questions (many about how the concerns we raised were linked to constitutional law rather than being questions of public policy), and Justice Dawe also asked a number of them (he seemed to be very interested in the question of whether any system could conceivably satisfy our definition of effective representation - ie, requiring electing an MP aligned with our political views).

Nicolas made a final rebuttal to the government's presentation, and then the appeal wrapped. Now we wait for the court to issue its ruling (likely about 2-4 months from now).

Update on "Leave to Appeal" Fund:

While we very much hope that the court agrees with us and declares our current voting system unconstitutional, we're also actively preparing for what comes afterwards. Regardless of the decision, we expect that whoever loses the appeal will seek leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. We're currently fundraising to be ready to do that as soon as the decision comes down early next year.

So far, our supporters and partners have donated almost $17k of the $30k we'll need for that, so we're well on our way. Ideally, we'd like to have most of the balance in hand by shortly after the appeal so that there are no delays once the appeal decision comes down.

To show your support and contribute to this next stage, simply click the button below:

Thanks again for your ongoing support - as always, we absolutely couldn't do this without you!

Grace Chitate, Springtide

Antony Hodgson, Fair Voting BC

PS: A reminder that any donations over $25 in a year will be eligible for a charitable donation receipt. These receipts produce tax rebates ranging (depending on where you live) from 19-75% of your donation for the first $200 and 40-58% on the portion of total charitable donations above $200."

End Quote

 

Canada’s election laws have silenced Green [and "labour"] voters for far too long – says constitutional expert in Op Ed supportive of the Charter Challenge for Fair Voting

David Beatty, a noted constitutional expert, recently wrote an Op Ed in the Globe and Mail entitled "Canada's election laws have silenced Green voters for far too long," which is supportive of the Charter Challenge for Fair Voting. 

But it's not only Green voters who should take note of this challenge: Beatty has demonstrated his constitutional expertise with publications such as Putting the Charter to Work: Designing a Constitutional Labour Code which may be of interest not only to Green Voters interested in labour rights but also to NDP voters interested in labour rights: 

Both these voter groups should take an interest in how the Charter Challenge for Fair Voting can help in their particular struggles for their basic civil rights -- rights that have been denied to them by the unfair electoral systems in Canada and its provinces which, on average, tend to favour the top two dominant parties. See evidence in Footnote below.

Question: Would a court decision in the Charter Challenge for Fair Voting apply to provincial electoral systems as well, or just the federal system?

Answer (from this link on the Charter Challenge website): "Our case asks the court to rule specifically on the federal voting system. A decision in our favour would only have immediate implications and effects on the federal government.

However, a Supreme Court decision in favour of our case would set a strong precedent for all future cases of it’s kind. In many cases involving charter law where a strong precedent has been set by the Surpeme Court, it increases the chances that a case will be resolved at a lower court, and governments often take proactive steps to avoid legal battles they cannot win."

Footnote:

Above graph sourced from "Is Canada Fair?" at this link. (Orange is NDP; green is Greens; red is Liberal; blue is Conservative.)

Also, it should be noted that the above graph shows national results only. But when you look at regions, election results from all parties are distorted with First Past the Post, as we see in Wilf Day's quote below (See his great blog at this link):

Quote:

"Myth: PR helps only the NDP and Greens.
Fact: In the 2015 election, in the GTA 396,000 NDP votes were ineffective, disregarded, wasted, and thrown in the garbage can by our skewed winner-take-all system.
But 944,000 Conservative votes in the GTA were ineffective.
And so were 993,000 Liberal votes in Western Canada.
While 235,000 Atlantic NDP voters elected no one, so did 249,000 Atlantic Conservative voters and 384,000 Alberta Liberals.
Across Canada, 8,921,682 votes were ineffective. That’s 50.7% of all votes cast.
But the majority of those disregarded votes were for Liberals and Conservatives: 30% for Conservatives and 26% for Liberals, while 29% were for NDP candidates, 7% for the Bloc Quebecois, and 6% for the Greens."

(End Quote)

My response to Wilfred Day: While all of this is true, the national averages, as opposed to regional data, shown in the graph above, speaks for itself. In the national average, it is generally* the smaller parties who lose the most in ANY country that uses the "First Past The Post" voting system. In Canada's case, it's the NDP and Greens who generally* lose most.

* Parties that have voters dispersed across many ridings/regions are worse off than parties (such as the Bloc) which are not dispersed. 

Part 2 of: A Shared Commitment to Fairness: Fair Vote Canada and the Charter Challenge for Fair Voting

(This is a continuation of Part 1 at this link.)

Both Fair Vote Canada and the Charter Challenge for Fair Voting have long pointed to the fact that, quote, “in Canada’s current electoral system, the majority of voters cast ballots for a candidate who does not get elected.”

In the next few months that statement/fact will become even more prominent in the work of both of those organizations.

That statement is found in MP Lisa Marie Barron’s Private Member’s motion, M-86, to establish a Citizens' Assembly on Electoral Reform. That motion is actively supported by Fair Vote Canada. See link.  It will be debated in the fall of 2023 and voted on either in the fall of 2023 or early 2024.

But even before that happens, the Charter Challenge for Fair Voting has a court date of Sep 26 in Toronto, and its case evidence also includes a variation of that same statement of fact.

[ UPDATE ]:

The case was first heard in the Ontario Superior Court from Sep 26-28, 2023. Justice Ed Morgan handed down his ruling on Nov 30, 2023.

Unfortunately, Justice Morgan dismissed our Application, so we filed a Notice of Appeal on Dec 29, 2023. That Notice of Appeal can be downloaded from the Charter Challenge "Appeal" web page which is at this link.

Why does M-86 allow the option of not reforming something that is so clearly unfair?

The first part of the M-86 motion describes an unfair situation in which “the majority of voters cast ballots for a candidate who does not get elected.”

Given the fact that other countries can do so much better, it seems obvious that this situation is in need of reform. Yet the last part of the motion then implies that this situation may, or may not be, in need of reform: It reads:
“(b) in the opinion of the House, the government should create a Canadian citizens’ assembly on electoral reform, which would,…
…(iii) determine if electoral reform is recommended for Canada, and, if so, recommend specific measures that would foster a healthier democracy."
End Quote

Notice the word “if.”

It’s reasonable to ask the Citizens’ Assembly to “recommend specific measures that would foster a healthier democracy,” but it seems odd to give the citizens’ assembly the option of not recommending to reform a situation in which “the majority of voters cast ballots for a candidate who does not get elected.”

Was this oddity in M-86 part of a strategy to make it less binding, less threatening and therefore more likely to pass?

In any case, because of this oddity in M-86, there is clearly a need for an additional impetus for change that is not found within M-86.

Additional Impetus for change

Additional impetus for change would come if the plans of the Charter Challenge for Fair Voting are successful in the following two goals: 1. the Supreme Court rules that our current voting system contravenes the Charter, and 2. the Supreme Court orders the government to adopt a voting system that complies with the Charter. 

If that happens then the Citizens Assembly would be obligated to “determine” that “electoral reform” is indeed “recommended for Canada.”  In that scenario, that obligation would likely be manifested through the power of the House of Commons instead of the courts. In other words, the act of setting up a Citizens Assembly in the first place would likely be a political decision by the House of Commons, not a legal decision that bypasses the House.

Could the Charter Challenge for Fair Voting work in Tandem with a Citizens’ Assembly on Electoral Reform?

Réal Lavergne, former President of Fair Vote Canada, presented that possibility on Feb 16, 2023 with this quote:

“And we’re hoping that the Supreme Court will pronounce itself on that and hopefully that the Supreme Court will say you have to find a way to hand this over to citizens and the Citizens’ Assembly would be one way to do it.” (1)

In that type of tandem effort it makes a lot of sense for Fair Vote Canada to push for a Citizens’ Assembly on Electoral Reform exactly at the same time as the Charter Challenge for Fair Voting pushes for a victory in the courts.

Footnotes:

Footnote 1:
Réal Lavergne’s quote is found here: “Advancing Proportional Representation in Canada” Stephan Kyburz interviews Réal Lavergne in this Feb 16, 2023 episode of “Rules of The Game: Discussing Democratic Institutions” Blog/Podcast  See this link 

Lavergne mentions that interview on his Facebook page Feb 16, 2023 (See this link): Here I paraphrase his comments further in that Facebook thread:

It would be valuable if we could get the courts to say that it was largely politics and partisan interests that have prevented the adoption of electoral reform. If the courts say that then that would be a reason for them NOT to give the decision on electoral reform to the government in power.

If the courts do rule that the existing electoral system needs to be overhauled, then to develop a new system… “some sort of independent process is required and there needs to be a way to ensure that independence, based on multi-party or all-party support.” “So, [it should be] either a Citizens Assembly or some other form of citizen-based process that is unassailable.”

Countries With Proportional Electoral Systems Have Lower Levels Of Income Inequality

Evidence that countries with proportional electoral systems have lower levels of income inequality has been compiled by Fair Vote Canada on their Evidence webpage at this link.  The below is an excerpt/quote from that webpage:

Income Inequality

Lijphart (2012: 282) found that countries with proportional systems had considerably lower levels of income inequality.

Likewise, Birchfield and Crepaz (1998:192) found that “consensual political institutions [which use PR] tend to reduce income inequalities whereas majoritarian institutions have the opposite effect.” The results of the regression work they present were highly significant, with PR accounting for 51% of the variance in income inequality across countries. Birchfield and Crepaz explain this result in terms of the higher degree of political power of people in PR systems. In their words (1998:191):

“The more widespread the access to political institutions, and the more representative the political system, the more citizens will take part in the political process to change it in their favour which will manifest itself, among other things, in lower income inequality. Such consensual political institutions make the government more responsive to the demands of a wider range of citizens.”

Vincenzo Verardi, in a study of 28 democracies (2005), also found that when proportionality increases, inequality decreases. Iversen and Soskice (2006) found that PR is associated with greater efforts to promote income redistribution.

Bernauer, Giger and Rosset (2015) looking at 24 Parliamentary democracies, found that the political preferences of low income citizens are better represented in a more proportional system, and the political preferences of the rich are better represented in a winner-take-all system.

Footnotes:

Lijphart, Arend (2012). Patterns of Democracy. Government Forms and Performance in 36 Countries. New Haven, CT: Yale Press.

Birchfield, Vicki and Crepaz, Markus (1998). “The Impact of Constitutional Structures and Collective and Competitive Veto Points on Income Inequality in Industrialized Democracies.” European Journal of Political Research 34: 175-200.

Verardi, Vincenzo (January 2005). ”Electoral Systems and Income Inequality.” Economics Letters, 86-1: 7-12.

Iversen, T., & Soskice, D. (2006). “Electoral Systems and the Politics of Coalitions: Why Some Democracies Redistribute More Than Others". American Political Science Review 100-2: 165–81.

Bernauer, Giger and Rosset (2015). “Mind the gap: Do proportional electoral systems foster a more equal representation of men and women, poor and rich?” International Political Science Review. 36-1: 78-98.

 

Trudeau, and the Liberal Party on Electoral Reform, May 10 2023

 

On May 10, 2023 in Parliament:
See this video at 15:21:30

Mike Morrice: “Mr. Speaker Canadians overwhelming support creating a Citizens Assembly on Electoral Reform. This past weekend, Liberal Party members strongly voted in support of it, too. Yet the Prime Minister won’t make electoral reform a priority. So, if not Canadians, and if not his own party, who else does the Prime Minister need to hear from before he’s ready to act?”

Justin Trudeau: “Mr. Speaker, as Members of this House know, I’m committed and continue to be hopeful about replacing the First Past the Post system with a preferential ballot. I moved forward in 2015 to live up to that promise and to find consensus in this House of Commons because when you change something as fundamental as the way we elect this House it has to be done with consensus. Unfortunately there was no consensus on moving forward with a ranked ballot therefore we chose not to do it. I continue to be open. If anyone wants to move forward with a preferential ballot I’m happy to talk with them but we will not impose a change on Canadians.”

Fact check (See source below): 

First, Trudeau speaks of "replacing the First Past the Post system with a preferential ballot." In the next sentence he refers to "[moving] forward in 2015 to live up to that promise."

What exactly was "that" 2015 promise? Was it, as he said, to "[replace] the First Past the Post system with a preferential ballot?"

No.

Instead, the Liberal 2015 platform promised an all-party committee to (quote) "review a wide variety of reforms, such as ranked ballots, proportional representation, mandatory voting . . ."
Notice the words “ranked ballots” are separated by a comma before the words “proportional representation.”
See pg 27 in this document (download PDF): Click Here or copy and paste the below link into your browser:
https://liberal.ca/wp-content/uploads/sites/292/2020/09/New-plan-for-a-strong-middle-class.pdf?