A Compilation of Key Excerpts (with Editor's Notes by Boyd
Reimer)
Why a Charter
Challenge:
Quote from the Charter Challenge for Fair Voting website:
“The Charter
guarantees our right to vote and our right to equal treatment. It's up to the
Supreme Court to decide when this principle has been violated….
“Each citizen is entitled
to be represented in government.” – Justice Beverly McLachlin
That’s each of
us, not just some of us. That principle has been upheld in several cases throughout
Canadian elections.
The
court has also said that voters should be treated equally, but when only half
of us have an MP we support, the system is discriminatory and excludes
those voices. [Countries with electoral
systems based on proportional representation do much better in terms of voter
equality (see evidence below).]
Constitutional
lawyers have advised us that we have a worthwhile case to make against our
current voting system on these grounds.
Why not change the system through political channels?
Governments
of various stripes have supported electoral reform while in opposition, and on
the campaign trail only to back away from the promise of reform once elected.
The
present government and parliament have decided not to proceed with electoral
reform. It could be years, or decades, and several elections, before electoral
reform becomes a possibility again. Democratic rights are human rights. It's
the Supreme Court's job to ensure that those rights are protected when
parliament neglects to protect them.”
End
Quote from the Charter Challenge for Fair Voting website:
Editor's Note: How to make a strong
case in a Charter Challenge
The Charter guarantees rights to individual
citizens; not political parties. Therefore a successful Charter Challenge for
Fair Voting must show how our current electoral system violates the Charter
rights of individual citizens -- not political parties. (1)
“But,” you may be asking, “has the Supreme Court
already made a previous ruling about fair voting and fair representation of
individuals? In other words, do we have a pre-existing precedent and thereby
have a much stronger foundation upon which to build our case?”
The answer is “yes!”
Here’s a quote from the Supreme Court of Canada (1991 Saskatchewan Election Boundaries
Reference, p 183). (This ruling is about the sizes of riding populations):
“[The result of] a system which dilutes one citizen’s
vote unduly as compared with another citizen’s … will be uneven and unfair
representation.”
The above 1991 quote, among other things, provided Antony Hodgson with a strong foundation to submit an affidavit as evidence in
the case.
That key affidavit is explored below.
Editor's Note: A remarkable finding
of the Affidavit of Antony Hodgson
Before we explore that affidavit in detail, here’s one
of its most remarkable findings:
Unfortunately, in recent decades our electoral system is
still allowing for differences in voter power that are five times greater than
those 1991 allowable differences in voter power due to the sizes of riding
populations (see evidence below).
This means
that, in terms of voter equality, one part of our democratic process (our
electoral system) is five times worse than another part (differences allowed in
sizes of riding populations).
If voter
equality is like a chain then it’s only as strong as its weakest link. The weaker
link in this case is our electoral system--as the below measurements and
evidence show.
A weakness
in voter equality is detrimental because the validity of our democracy depends
on the strength of its voter equality.
If the validity
of our democracy is like a chain then it’s only as strong as its weakest link. In
Canada’s case, a weak link is a relatively low level of voter equality in our
electoral system--as the below measurements and evidence show.
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Photo credit: capacityllc.com
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Digesting Excerpts
from the Affidavit of Antony Hodgson to the Charter Challenge for Fair Voting case
The Affidavit PDF is available for download from this link (See “Fair Voting BC”):
Quotes, paraphrases, and sources from that affidavit
are noted in the below “Excerpt
Compilation Article” in parentheses (), and/or footnoted. Underlined emphasis
is my own (ie Boyd Reimer).
Introductory
Synopsis:
In the [1991] Saskatchewan
Electoral Boundaries Reference [on the sizes
of riding populations], the Supreme Court of Canada concluded (at p 183) that
the first condition of effective representation is “relative parity of voting
power.” The court argued that dilution of voting power is
problematic because it reduces the legislative power of the citizen and access
to and assistance from his or her representative. In their words:
“A system
which dilutes one citizen’s vote unduly as compared with another citizen’s vote
runs the risk of providing inadequate representation to the citizen whose vote
is diluted. The legislative power of the citizen whose vote is diluted
will be reduced, as may be access to and assistance from his or her
representative. The result will be uneven and unfair representation.” (Pg 29,
par 63)
This previous
Supreme Court ruling on citizens’ “legislative power” as it
pertains to electoral boundaries can be used as a point of comparison to show
that Canada’s electoral system is not as fair in the distribution of legislative
power to individual citizens as when we compare it with the electoral systems
of countries with proportional representation.
When we use
something called the “Legislative Power Share score” to precisely and
mathematically measure and compare the different degrees of “legislative power”
that different citizens have within our electoral system... we find that
“the [difference and] disparity in
Legislative Power Share scores in recent decades has typically been over five times higher
than the disparity allowed by the courts in the sizes of riding
populations.” (Pg 56, par 101)
What exactly is
a “Legislative Power Share score” and how
does it precisely and mathematically measure and compare the different degrees
of “legislative power” that different citizens have within our electoral
system?
Let’s answer that by taking a deeper dive into
the “Parity in Legislative Power” project carried out by Antony Hodgson when he
prepared his Affidavit for the Charter Challenge for Fair Voting.
First, notice that “parity of voting power”
is a phrase taken directly from the above-mentioned precedent ruling of
the Supreme Court.
The the Affidavit of Antony Hodgson defines and
summarizes three “indices,” which are “measurements,”
or “metrics,” in the following way (pg 33, par 71):
1. The Representation
Metric (RM) - the percentage of voters who are
represented by an MP for whom they voted;
2. The Legislative
Power Share (LPS) Score - the share of legislative voting power held by individual voters relative to their ‘fair share’ (parity)
3. The Legislative
Power Disparity Index (LPDI) - The distribution of legislative power amongst voters. (It summarizes the integrated impact
and effect of disparities in legislative power that are felt and measured at
the individual voter level by the Legislative Power Share score.)
[End of Synopsis]
&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
A Deeper Dive…
… into the Affidavit of Antony Hodgson's measurement of the Legislative Power of Individuals:
(Below excerpts compiled by Boyd Reimer)(3)
1. The Representation Metric (or “measurement”) identifies the percentage of voters who are represented by an MP
for whom they voted. If the votes of all voters
counted towards electing an MP, the Representation Metric would be 100%. (pg 35, par 73) The below comparison chart
(Figure 11) is taken from pg. 40:
Figure 11. Representation Metrics for Canada (2019
federal election) and two recent elections in each of three
selected countries using proportional voting (to demonstrate consistency of
findings). The solid colours
represent those voters who are represented by a representative for whom they
have explicitly voted (‘direct’ representation), while the shaded colours
represent those voters who are represented by a representative
who won a seat by virtue of votes cast for the representative’s party
(‘indirect’ representation). Norway uses a List PR system with 19 compensatory
seats out of 169 seats total, Ireland uses
a Single Transferable Voting System, and New Zealand uses a Mixed Member
Proportional system. The
two systems that use multi-member regions (Norway and Ireland) have similarly
high levels of direct representation,
while New Zealand has a level of direct representation similar to that of
Canada due to its use
of single member districts. The two systems that have a national compensatory
element (Norway and New
Zealand) have similarly high levels of total representation.
2. Legislative Power Share (LPS) Score (pg 40): measures
the share of legislative voting power that individual voters hold compared to
other voters in Canada (their ‘fair share’ or 'parity'). (pg 41, par 78)
Pg 41, par 79: Each of Canada’s 338 MPs holds an equal share of legislative
power in the Canadian Parliament. If a voter did not vote for their elected MP,
this voter had no influence on the ability of the MP to exercise legislative
power (and their MP did not rely on their vote). We therefore assign this voter
a Legislative Power Share score of zero.
On the
other hand, if a voter voted for their elected MP, the voter’s share of the
MP’s legislative power depends on how many other voters in the riding also
voted for the MP.
Pg 42, par
81: To determine the “legislative power share” of a voter who voted for their
MP, we divide the average number of votes cast per seat in that voter’s riding
by the number of votes received by the elected MP. We then apply a weighting
factor to adjust the share of each voter’s legislative power depending on
whether the total number of voters in the riding was greater or smaller than in
other ridings (since voters in ridings with fewer voters have more impact on
the election of an MP than voters in ridings with more voters).
Ideally,
if each voter had equal influence on the makeup of the legislature, then every
voter would have a Legislative Power Share score of 1. If a voter’s Legislative
Power Share score is greater than 1, that voter effectively has their voice in
Parliament amplified relative to the average voter. Conversely, if a voter has
a Legislative Power Share score of less than 1, then that voter has a
diminished or diluted voice in Parliament. The relative representation of
different voters becomes more uneven and unfair the more the distribution of
LPS scores deviates from a uniform value of 1.
Pg 44: Figure 12: “Legislative Power Share”
(LPS) Score Range in the 2019 Canadian federal election
Figure 12. Histogram of Legislative Power Share
scores in the 2019 Canadian federal election. Scores closer
to the parity value of 1 are shown in green, while scores further away are
shown in shades of yellow and red. The sum of all bars in the histogram is
100%.
Pg 48, Figure 14: Percentage of Voters with
Various LPS Scores – comparing Canada to Countries with proportional
representation
Figure 14. Distributions in Legislative Power
Share scores in Canada’s 2019 federal election and in recent elections in three
selected countries using proportional voting systems.
The next chart, Figure
15 is basically an excerpt from the above chart. (pg 50)
Figure 15. Percentage of voters with a Legislative
Power Share score within +/-10% (dark green), +/- 25%
(dark green + light green) and +/-50% (dark green + light green + yellow) of
parity (colours correspond
to previous chart). All comparator countries have at least two-thirds of voters
with LPS scores
within +/-50% of 1 (ranging from 67-92%), while Canada has fewer than 10% of
voters within that
margin.
3. Legislative Power Disparity Index: The distribution of legislative power
amongst voters. (pg 50)
To understand that concept simply look at the below
Figure 16 (pg 51), keeping in
mind that the bars at
either end (sides) of the plot show the shares we would expect if
legislative power were distributed equitably. In other words, the black line across is the benchmark of uniform equality:
Figure 16. Distribution of Legislative Power
Shares across different segments of the voters for all federal elections
in Canada since Confederation. The share of legislative power held by the
bottom 50% of voters is
shown in grey, the next 40% in orange, and the top 10% in red. The bars at either end (sides)
of the plot show the shares we would expect if legislative power were
distributed equitably.
Pg 51, par
92: In a voting system with perfect legislative power parity, the legislative
power shares would be distributed evenly across all voters (as in the separated bars at either side of the figure above).
In Canadian elections, however, the 10% of voters with the greatest legislative
power scores have consistently held close to 25% of the legislative voting
power. The next 40% of voters have consistently held most of the remaining 75%
of legislative voting power while the bottom 50% of voters have often held no
legislative voting power at all in the past 60 years.
The disparity in legislative power between voters in Canadian elections
illustrated above can be more precisely visualized and quantified using tools
drawn from the political science and economics literature. In this literature,
the Gini coefficient is a commonly-used index to measure disparity in the
distribution of a property (e.g., income or wealth); here we use it to measure
disparity in the distribution of Legislative Power Share scores. It is
calculated by plotting the cumulative percentage of the property against the
percentage of the population that holds that percentage of property, ordered
from those holding the least of the property to the most (this is known as a
Lorenz curve).
[(Ed. note:
But since the charts --both above and below-- are visually self explanatory it’s not absolutely necessary to fully comprehend that they show the “Gini coefficient,” or “Lorenz curve.”)]
Pg 52, par
94: The chart below (Figure 17) illustrates Lorenz curves for four elections –
one from Canada and one for each of the three example countries using
proportional voting systems. In each plot, the blue line indicates an equitable
distribution of legislative power - i.e., each voter holding equal shares. The
red line is the Lorenz curve, which shows the cumulative shares of legislative
power held by the percentage of voters on the horizontal axis.
In an
election with an equitable distribution of legislative power (i.e., where each
voter equally contributed to the election of an MP), the two lines would
coincide. In contrast, increasing deviations between the red and
blue lines indicate increasing inequities in the distribution of
legislative power in the election.
Figure 17 (Pg 53) (LPS = Legislative Power Share):
